xxiii, 579 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm. Content notes : I. Static games of complete information --
1. Games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium --
2. Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium --
II. Dynamic games of complete information --
3. Extensive-form games --
4. Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions --
5. Repeated games --
III. Static games of incomplete information --
6. Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium --
7. Bayesian games and mechanism design --
IV. Dynamic games of incomplete information --
8. Equilibrium refinements: perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection --
9. Reputation effects --
10. Sequential bargaining under incomplete information --
V. Advanced topics --
11. More equilibrium refinements: stability, forward induction, and iterated weak dominance --
12. Advanced topics in strategic-form games --
13. Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium --
14. Common knowledge and games --
Index.

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