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Game theory / Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole.

By: Fudenberg, Drew [author].
Contributor(s): Tirole, Jean [author].
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookPublisher: New Delhi: Ane Books, 2015Description: xxiii, 579 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.ISBN: 9788180520822.Subject(s): Game theoryDDC classification: 519.3
Contents:
I. Static games of complete information -- 1. Games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium -- 2. Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium -- II. Dynamic games of complete information -- 3. Extensive-form games -- 4. Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions -- 5. Repeated games -- III. Static games of incomplete information -- 6. Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium -- 7. Bayesian games and mechanism design -- IV. Dynamic games of incomplete information -- 8. Equilibrium refinements: perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection -- 9. Reputation effects -- 10. Sequential bargaining under incomplete information -- V. Advanced topics -- 11. More equilibrium refinements: stability, forward induction, and iterated weak dominance -- 12. Advanced topics in strategic-form games -- 13. Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium -- 14. Common knowledge and games -- Index.
Summary: This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point.
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Item type Current location Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
Books Books ISI Library, Kolkata
 
519.3 F952 (Browse shelf) Checked out 23/09/2017 C26542
Total holds: 0

Includes bibliographical references and indexes

I. Static games of complete information --
1. Games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium --
2. Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium --
II. Dynamic games of complete information --
3. Extensive-form games --
4. Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions --
5. Repeated games --
III. Static games of incomplete information --
6. Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium --
7. Bayesian games and mechanism design --
IV. Dynamic games of incomplete information --
8. Equilibrium refinements: perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection --
9. Reputation effects --
10. Sequential bargaining under incomplete information --
V. Advanced topics --
11. More equilibrium refinements: stability, forward induction, and iterated weak dominance --
12. Advanced topics in strategic-form games --
13. Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium --
14. Common knowledge and games --
Index.

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point.

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Other editions of this work

Game theory by Fudenberg Drew

MIT Press (Cambridge) , 1993 xxi,579p. 56

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