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http://hdl.handle.net/10263/3256
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Sen, A | - |
dc.contributor.author | Dutta, Bhaskar | - |
dc.contributor.author | Peters, H | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-02-09T18:40:41Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-02-09T18:40:41Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2002 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of economic theory,V106,P392-416 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10263/3256 | - |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.subject | Public good | en_US |
dc.subject | Probabilistic mechanism | en_US |
dc.subject | Strategy proofness | en_US |
dc.subject | Random dictatorship | en_US |
dc.title | Strategy proof probabilistic mechanisms in economics with pure public | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Economics |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Binder1.pdf | 2.85 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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