Abstract:
This thesis consists of three empirical essays that explore distinct themes in the realm of
political economy and economics of institutions. All, in essence, are investigations into the
role of distinct attributes of political institutions and political actors induced by these
institutions, in shaping varied development outcomes. The first chapter begins by asking
whether a change in political representation leads to a change in expressed trust in political
institutions. This study shows that increased representation leads to higher political trust and
further shows that such improvement in political trust is accompanied by increase in voter
turnout and mediated by an improvement in infrastructure and public goods provision. The
second chapter shifts focus from features of political institutions to characteristics of political
actors and their consequences for human capital. It investigates the impact of criminality of
elected representatives on the provision of publicly financed higher education institutions and
finds that electoral districts that elect leaders charged with serious crimes witness reduced
provision of such institutions. The third chapter continues with the broad narrative of
characteristics of politicians and evaluates a policy that introduced minimum education
requirements for candidates contesting local elections in the context of a large state in India.
Findings from this study show that restricting candidature based on education qualifications
can lead to lower representation of historically disadvantaged communities and women while,
not leading to any demonstrable improvement in leader performance
