Abstract:
Lattice-based cryptography is a highly regarded contender for post-quantum standard-
ization by NIST. NIST has already chosen “CRYSTALS-KYBER” a lattice-based public-key
encryption and key-establishment algorithm and “CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM”, a lattice-based
digital signature algorithm. The current lattice-based schemes are based on Oded Regev’s
original construction, which sparked significant interest in the cryptographic community
due to its post-quantum security and the equivalence between worst-case and average-case
hardness.
Oded Regev’s cryptographic scheme is built upon a problem called “Learning with Error”
(LWE), which is a generalization of the “Learning Parity with Noise” (LPN) problem. This
scheme is straightforward to implement and has gained attention for its simplicity. Previ-
ously, Mikolas Ajtai demonstrated the worst-case to average-case equivalence for a set of
hard lattice problems. Regev’s seminal paper demonstrated that the security of LWE-based
cryptosystems could rely on the hardness of worst-case lattice problems. While this result is
theoretically groundbreaking, the reduction from hard lattice problems to LWE is not tightly
bound, which limits its practical applicability.
The tightness of a reduction is a critical factor often underestimated. The tightness gap
of a reduction quantifies the concreteness of the reduction, and a tight reduction is valuable
for translating theoretical hardness guarantees into practical scenarios. Cryptography, as a
field, prioritizes practical applicability. Non-tight reductions lead to less efficient systems but
they have practical applications. Regev’s work has prompted numerous follow-up studies.
One significant effort aimed to make the reduction classical, as the original reduction was
quantum-based. Additionally, subsequent research has focused on enhancing the efficiency
of LWE-based cryptosystems by utilizing various algebraic variants of lattices, such as ideal
and module lattices.
We thoroughly investigate these major reductions to unveil their true significance in
terms of reduction tightness. Furthermore, we conduct a concrete security analysis of these
reductions and identify several areas for improvement.