Game theory and mechanism design / Y Narahari.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Introduction and overview--
2. Key notions in game theory--
3. Extensive form games--
4. Strategic form games--
5. Dominant strategy equilibria--
6. Pure strategy Nash equilibria--
7. Mixed strategies and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium--
8. Utility theory--
9. Matrix games--
10. Existence of Nash equilibrium--
11. Computation of Nash equilibria--
12. Complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium--
13. Bayesian games--
14. Introduction to mechanism design--
15. Implementation of social choice functions by mechanisms--
16. Incentive compatibility and revelation theorem--
17. The Gibbard-Satterhwaite impossibility theorem--
18. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms--
19. Mechanism design space in quasilinear environment--
20. Auctions--
21. Optimal mechanisms and Myerson auction--
22. Mechanism design for sponsored search auctions--
23. Implementation in ex-post Nash equilibrium--
24. Further topics in mechanism design--
25. Correlated strategies and correlated equilibrium--
26. The two person bargaining problem--
27. Coalitional games with transferable utility--
28. The core of coalitional games--
29. The shapley value--
30. Other solution concepts in cooperative game theory--
31. Stable matching--
32. Epilogue--
33. Mathematical preliminaries--
Index.

This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the "science" behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society. The importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sci.