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Collective preference and choice / Shmuel Nitzan.

By: Publication details: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2010.Description: xvii, 255 p. : illustrations ; 24 cmISBN:
  • 9780521722131
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 302.3 23 N733
Contents:
1. The reason for the problems -- 2. Brief overview of the problems -- 3. The relationship between preferences and choice -- 4. Do social preferences exist? -- 5. The desirable decision rule: axiomatization -- 6. Rule selection based on compromise with the unanimity criterion -- 7. Paradoxes of voting -- 8. Majority tyranny -- 9. The problems of inefficient provision of public goods -- 10. Do individuals reveal their true preferences? -- 11. Which rule is better: the expert rule or the simple majority rule? decisional errors in dichotomous choice and Condorect's jury theoroem -- 12. The optimal decision rule under uncertain dichotomous choice -- Bibliography -- Author index -- Subject index.
Summary: A study of the classical aggregation problems that arise in social choice theory, voting theory, and group decision-making under uncertainty.
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Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
Books ISI Library, Kolkata 302.3 N733 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Available 136552
Total holds: 0

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

1. The reason for the problems --
2. Brief overview of the problems --
3. The relationship between preferences and choice --
4. Do social preferences exist? --
5. The desirable decision rule: axiomatization --
6. Rule selection based on compromise with the unanimity criterion --
7. Paradoxes of voting --
8. Majority tyranny --
9. The problems of inefficient provision of public goods --
10. Do individuals reveal their true preferences? --
11. Which rule is better: the expert rule or the simple majority rule? decisional errors in dichotomous choice and Condorect's jury theoroem --
12. The optimal decision rule under uncertain dichotomous choice --
Bibliography --
Author index --
Subject index.

A study of the classical aggregation problems that arise in social choice theory, voting theory, and group decision-making under uncertainty.

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