Online Public Access Catalogue (OPAC)
Library,Documentation and Information Science Division

“A research journal serves that narrow

borderland which separates the known from the unknown”

-P.C.Mahalanobis




1 online resource (xii, 372 p.) : ill. - (Econometric Society monographs ; no. 36) "These volumes contain the papers ... of the Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society ... held at the University of Washington, Seattle, in August 2000)--Pref. Content notes : Cover -- Half-title -- Series-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Contributors -- Preface -- CHAPTER 1 Sorting, Education, and Inequality -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. SORTING INTO NEIGHBORHOODS -- 2.1. Multicommunity Models: The Economics of Sorting -- 2.2. The Efficiency of Local Provision of Education -- 2.3. Comparing Systems of Financing Public Education: Dynamic Considerations -- 3. SORTING INTO SCHOOLS -- 4. HOUSEHOLD SORTING -- 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- References -- CHAPTER 2 Wage Equations and Education Policy -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. INTERPRETING WAGE EQUATIONS -- 2.1. The Wage Equation in a Competitive Model -- 2.2. The Wage Equation in the Burdett...Mortensen Equilibrium Search Model -- 2.3. The Schooling Coefficient -- 2.4. A Brief Digression: Estimating the Schooling Coefficient by Using Natural Experiments -- 3. EXTENSIONS OF THE COMPETITIVE SKILL MARKET EQUILIBRIUM MODEL -- 3.1. Willis and Rosen -- 3.2. Heckman and Sedlacek -- 3.3. Keane and Wolpin -- 4. USE OF STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION OF SCHOOLING CHOICE MODELS FOR THE EVALUATION OF EDUCATION POLICIES -- 4.1. Graduation Bonuses -- 4.2. Tuition Effects -- 4.3. Relaxing Borrowing Constraints -- 5. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM -- 6. CONCLUSIONS -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- References -- Empirical and Theoretical Issues in the Analysis of Education Policy -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. SORTING, EDUCATION, AND INEQUALITY -- 3. WAGE EQUATIONS AND EDUCATION POLICY -- 4. CONCLUSION -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- References -- CHAPTER 3 Toward a Theory of Competition Policy -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. PRICE-FIXING AGREEMENTS -- 2.1. Fighting Collusion Per Se -- 2.2.Fighting Facilitating Practices -- 3. MERGER CONTROL -- 3.1. The Efficiency...Market Power Trade-Off -- 3.2. Assessing the Collusion Concern: The Role of Capacity Constraints -- 4. RESEARCH AGENDA -- 4.1. Procedures and Control Rights -- 4.2. Timing of Oversight -- 4.3. Information Intensiveness and Continued Relationship -- 4.4. Independence vis-�a-vis the Political Environment -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- References -- CHAPTER 4 Identification and Estimation of Cost Functions Using Observed Bid Data -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. IDENTIFYING MARGINAL COST FUNCTIONS FROM BIDS AND MARKET PRICES AND QUANTITIES -- 3. MODELS OF BEST-RESPONSE BIDDING AND BEST-RESPONSE PRICING -- 4. RECOVERING COST FUNCTION ESTIMATES FROM BEST-RESPONSE PRICES -- 5. RECOVERING COST FUNCTION ESTIMATES FROM BEST-RESPONSE BIDDING -- 6. OVERVIEW OF NEM1 -- 6.1. Market Structure in NEM1 -- 6.2. Market Rules in NEM1 -- 7. RECOVERING IMPLIED MARGINAL COST FUNCTIONS AND HEDGE CONTRACT QUANTITIES -- 8. IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKET MONITORING AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- References -- CHAPTER 5 Liquidity, Default, and Crashes -- 1. LIQUIDITY CRISES -- 2. DEFAULT AND ENDOGENOUS CONTRACTS -- 3. DEFAULT AND COLLATERAL -- 3.1. Contracts with Collateral -- 3.2. Production -- 4. COLLATERAL EQUILIBRIUM -- 4.1. The Budget Set -- 4.2. Equilibrium -- 4.3. The Orderly Function of Markets -- 4.4. Endogenous Contracts -- 4.5. Margins and Liqui Economics - Congresses. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS - Econometrics. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS - Statistics. Hansen, Lars Peter.Turnovsky, Stephen J.

Library, Documentation and Information Science Division, Indian Statistical Institute, 203 B T Road, Kolkata 700108, INDIA
Phone no. 91-33-2575 2100, Fax no. 91-33-2578 1412, ksatpathy@isical.ac.in


Visitor Counter