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Power versus prudence [electronic resource] : why nations forgo nuclear weapons / T.V. Paul.

By: Paul, T. V.
Contributor(s): Universit�e du Qu�ebec �a Montr�eal. Centre d'�etudes des politiques �etrang�eres et de s�ecurit�e | Teleglobe Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies.
Material type: TextTextSeries: Foreign policy, security and strategic studies: Publisher: Montreal, Que. : McGill-Queen's University Press, c2000Description: 1 online resource (viii, 227 p.).ISBN: 0773520864 (bound); 9780773520868 (bound); 0773520872 (pbk.); 9780773520875 (pbk.); 9780773568648 (electronic bk.); 0773568646 (electronic bk.).Subject(s): Nuclear weapons -- Government policy | Nuclear nonproliferation | Security, International | Armes nucl�eaires -- Politique gouvernementale | Non-prolif�eration nucl�eaire | S�ecurit�e internationale | Electronic books | POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / Arms ControlGenre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: Power versus prudence.DDC classification: 327.1/747 Online resources: EBSCOhost
Contents:
Theory -- Introduction: Theory and Nuclear Weapons Choices -- Explaining Nuclear Forbearance -- Aligned Major Economic Powers: Germany and Japan -- Aligned Middle Powers: Canada and Australia -- Neutral States: Sweden and Switzerland -- Non-Allied States: Argentina and Brazil -- Nuclear Choices of South Africa, Ukraine, and South Korea -- New Nuclear States: India, Pakistan, and Israel.
Summary: With the end of the Cold War, nuclear non-proliferation has emerged as a central issue in international security relations. While most existing works on nuclear proliferation deal with the question of nuclear acquisition, T.V. Paul explains why some states -- over 185 at present -- have decided to forswear nuclear weapons even when they have the technological capability or potential capability to develop them, and why some states already in possession of nuclear arms choose to dismantle them. Paul develops a prudential-realist model, arguing that a nation's national nuclear choices depend on specific regional security contexts: the non-great power stales most likely to forgo nuclear weapons are those in zones of low and moderate conflict, while nations likely to acquire such capability tend to be in zones of high conflict and engaged in protracted conflicts and enduring rivalries. He demonstrates that the choice to forbear acquiring nuclear weapons is also a function of the extent of security interdependence that states experience with other states, both allies and adversaries.
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Published for the Centre for Security and Foreign Policy Studies and The Teleglobe+Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies.

Includes bibliographical references (p. [195]-217) and index.

Description based on print version record.

Theory -- Introduction: Theory and Nuclear Weapons Choices -- Explaining Nuclear Forbearance -- Aligned Major Economic Powers: Germany and Japan -- Aligned Middle Powers: Canada and Australia -- Neutral States: Sweden and Switzerland -- Non-Allied States: Argentina and Brazil -- Nuclear Choices of South Africa, Ukraine, and South Korea -- New Nuclear States: India, Pakistan, and Israel.

With the end of the Cold War, nuclear non-proliferation has emerged as a central issue in international security relations. While most existing works on nuclear proliferation deal with the question of nuclear acquisition, T.V. Paul explains why some states -- over 185 at present -- have decided to forswear nuclear weapons even when they have the technological capability or potential capability to develop them, and why some states already in possession of nuclear arms choose to dismantle them. Paul develops a prudential-realist model, arguing that a nation's national nuclear choices depend on specific regional security contexts: the non-great power stales most likely to forgo nuclear weapons are those in zones of low and moderate conflict, while nations likely to acquire such capability tend to be in zones of high conflict and engaged in protracted conflicts and enduring rivalries. He demonstrates that the choice to forbear acquiring nuclear weapons is also a function of the extent of security interdependence that states experience with other states, both allies and adversaries.

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Other editions of this work

Power versus prudence by Paul, T. V. ©2000
Power versus prudence by Paul, T. V. ©2000
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