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The conflict over Kosovo [electronic resource] : why Milosevic decided to settle when he did / Stephen T. Hosmer.

By: Hosmer, Stephen T.
Material type: TextTextSeries: Internet resource: ; Online Rand research documents: Publisher: Santa Monica, CA : Rand, c2001Description: 1 online resource (xxxi, 155 p.).ISBN: 0585425388 (electronic bk.); 9780585425382 (electronic bk.); 0833030035; 9780833030030; 9780833032386 (electronic bk.); 0833032380 (electronic bk.).Report number: MR-1351Other title: Why Milosevic decided to settle when he did.Subject(s): Kosovo (Republic) -- History -- Civil War, 1998- | Milo�sevi�c, Slobodan, 1941-2006 | HISTORY -- General | Milo�sevi�c, Slobodan, (1941-2006) | Milosevic, Slobodan, ((1941- ...) | Organisation du trait�e de l'Atlantique nord | Guerre du Kosovo (1998-1999)Genre/Form: Electronic books. | Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: Conflict over Kosovo.DDC classification: 949.7103 Online resources: EBSCOhost
Contents:
Introduction -- He Assumed Accepting Rambouillet Terms Would Endanger His Rule -- He Assumed He Could Force NATO to Offer Better Terms -- He Realized That His Hoped-For Leverage on NATO Had Evaporated -- Bombing Produced a Popular Climate Conducive to Concessions -- Damage to "Dual-Use" Infrastructure Generated Growing Pressure -- Damage to Military Forces and KLA "Resurgence" Generated Little Pressure -- He Expected Unconstrained Bombing If NATO's Terms Were Rejected -- He Probably Also Worried About Threat of Future Invasion -- He Believed NATO's Terms Provided Him with Some Political Cover -- Concluding Observations.
Summary: This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Serbian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations.
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At head of title: Project Air Force.

"Prepared for the United States Air Force. Approved for public release, distribution unlimited."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 139-155).

Description based on print version record.

Introduction -- He Assumed Accepting Rambouillet Terms Would Endanger His Rule -- He Assumed He Could Force NATO to Offer Better Terms -- He Realized That His Hoped-For Leverage on NATO Had Evaporated -- Bombing Produced a Popular Climate Conducive to Concessions -- Damage to "Dual-Use" Infrastructure Generated Growing Pressure -- Damage to Military Forces and KLA "Resurgence" Generated Little Pressure -- He Expected Unconstrained Bombing If NATO's Terms Were Rejected -- He Probably Also Worried About Threat of Future Invasion -- He Believed NATO's Terms Provided Him with Some Political Cover -- Concluding Observations.

This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Serbian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations.

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Other editions of this work

The conflict over Kosovo by Hosmer, Stephen T. ©2001
The conflict over Kosovo by Hosmer, Stephen T. ©2001
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