Contract theory in continuous-time models / Jaksa Cvitanic and Jianfeng Zhang.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

PART I Introduction:
1.The Principal-Agent Problem.-
2.Single-Period Examples.-

PART II First Best. Risk Sharing under Full Information:
3.Linear Models with Project Selection, and Preview of Results.- 4.The General Risk Sharing Problem.-

PART III Second Best. Contracting Under Hidden Action- The Case of Moral Hazard:
5.The General Moral Hazard Problem.-
6.DeMarzo and Sannikov (2007), Biais et al (2007) - An Application to Capital Structure Problems: Optimal Financing of a Company.-

PART IV Third Best. Contracting Under Hidden Action and Hidden Type - The Case of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection:
7.Controlling the Drift.-
8.Controlling the Volatility-Drift Trade-Off with the First-Best.-

PART IV Appendix: Backward SDEs and Forward-Backward SDEs.-
9.Introduction.-
10.Backward SDEs.-
11.Decoupled Forward Backward SDEs.-
12.Coupled Forward Backward SDEs.-
References.-
Index.

There has been increased interest in continuous-time Principal-Agent models and their applications. This monograph surveys results of the theory using the approach of the so-called Stochastic Maximum Principle, in models driven by Brownian Motion.