Strategic foundations of general equilibrium : dynamic matching and bargaining games / Douglas Gale.
Series: The Churchill lectures in economic theoryPublication details: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, c2000Description: xi, 219 p. : illustrations ; 23 cmISBN:- 9780521644105
- 000SB:338.6048 23 G151
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Books | ISI Library, Kolkata | 000SB:338.6048 G151 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 137332 |
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000SB:338.54=4 T587 Verificatition statistique des theories des cycle economiques | 000SB:338.54=4 T587 Verificatition statistique des theories des cycle economiques | 000SB:338.58=59 Ur82 Methode statistice de ceretare a legitatilor de formare si miscare a preturilor | 000SB:338.6048 G151 Strategic foundations of general equilibrium : | 000SB:338.91=3 Sm637 Statistik und planung | 000SB:338 An617 Curso de applicaciones industriales de estadistica | 000SB:338 C749 Erude econometrique de la demande de tabac |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Markets and games --
2. Perfect competition --
3. Continuity and anonymity --
4. Bounded rationality --
5. Afterthoughts.
The theory of competition has held a central place in economic analysis since Adam Smith. This book, written by one of the most distinguished of contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of perfect competition. Beginning with a concise survey of how the theory of competition has evolved, Gale makes extensive and rigorous use of dynamic matching and bargaining models to provide a more complete description of how a competitive equlibrium is achieved. Whereas economists have made use of a macroscopic description of markets in which certain behavioral characteristics, such as price-taking behavior, are taken for granted, Gale uses game theory to re-evaluate this assumption, beginning with individual agents and modelling their strategic interaction. A strategic foundation for competitive equilibrium shows how such interaction leads to competitive, price-taking behavior. Essential reading for graduate courses in game theory and general equilibrium.
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