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Game theory / Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextPublication details: New Delhi: Ane Books, 2015.Description: xxiii, 579 pages : illustrations ; 24 cmISBN:
  • 9788180520822
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 519.3 23 F952
Contents:
I. Static games of complete information -- 1. Games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium -- 2. Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium -- II. Dynamic games of complete information -- 3. Extensive-form games -- 4. Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions -- 5. Repeated games -- III. Static games of incomplete information -- 6. Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium -- 7. Bayesian games and mechanism design -- IV. Dynamic games of incomplete information -- 8. Equilibrium refinements: perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection -- 9. Reputation effects -- 10. Sequential bargaining under incomplete information -- V. Advanced topics -- 11. More equilibrium refinements: stability, forward induction, and iterated weak dominance -- 12. Advanced topics in strategic-form games -- 13. Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium -- 14. Common knowledge and games -- Index.
Summary: This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point.
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Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
Books ISI Library, Kolkata 519.3 F952 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Available C26542
Total holds: 0

Includes bibliographical references and indexes

I. Static games of complete information --
1. Games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium --
2. Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium --
II. Dynamic games of complete information --
3. Extensive-form games --
4. Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions --
5. Repeated games --
III. Static games of incomplete information --
6. Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium --
7. Bayesian games and mechanism design --
IV. Dynamic games of incomplete information --
8. Equilibrium refinements: perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection --
9. Reputation effects --
10. Sequential bargaining under incomplete information --
V. Advanced topics --
11. More equilibrium refinements: stability, forward induction, and iterated weak dominance --
12. Advanced topics in strategic-form games --
13. Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium --
14. Common knowledge and games --
Index.

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point.

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