Essays in behavioral social choice theory/ Sarvesh Bandhu

Thesis (Ph.D.) - Indian Statistical Institute, 2020

Includes bibliography

Introduction -- Strategy-Proof Voting with Lying Costs -- Random Strategy-Proof Voting with Lexicographic Extension -- 4 Stochastic same-sidedness in random voting models -- A characterization of the status quo rule in the binary social choice model

Guided by Prof. Arunava Sen

This thesis comprises four essays on social choice theory. The first three essays/chapters consider models where voters follow “non-standard” rules for decision making. The last chapter considers the binary social choice model and analyzes the consequences of a new axiom.
The first chapter introduces a new axiom for manipulability when voters incur a cost if they misreport their true preference ordering. The second chapter considers the random voting model with strategic voters where standard stochastic dominance strategy-proofness is replaced by strategy-proofness under two lexicographic criteria. The third chapter also considers the random voting model but from a non-strategic perspective. It introduces a new “robustness to small mistakes” by voters. The last chapter provides a characterization of the status quo rule. We provide a brief description of each chapter below.