Stability and (obviously) strategy-proofness in matching theory/ Pinaki Mandal
Material type:
TextPublication details: Kolkata: Indian Statistical Institute, 2021Description: 118 pagesSubject(s): DDC classification: - 23 306.8193 M271
- Guided by Prof. Souvik Roy.
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| THESIS | ISI Library, Kolkata | 306.8193 M271 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | E-Thesis | TH532 |
Browsing ISI Library, Kolkata shelves Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)
| No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | |||||
| 306.81095957 B138 Nuptiality and population policy | 306.8109729 Un58 Some Relationship between nuptiality and fertility in countries of the West Indies/ | 306.810994 H154 Age at marriage and proportions marrying | 306.8193 M271 Stability and (obviously) strategy-proofness in matching theory/ | 306.82 B875 Early Brahmanical system of Gotra and Pravara | 306.820954 G427 Two Brahmanical institutions | 306.820973 M531 Marriage and family today |
Thesis (Ph.D.) - Indian Statistical Institute, 2022
Includes bibliographical references
Introduction -- Obviously strategy-proof implementation of assignment rules: a new characterization -- On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options -- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods when preferences are single-peaked -- Matchings under stability, minimum regret, and forced and forbidden pairs in marriage problem
Guided by Prof. Souvik Roy.
There are no comments on this title.
