A course in microeconomic theory/ David M. Creps

Includes index and bibliography

An overview -- The theory of consumer choice and demand -- Choice under uncertainty -- Dynamic choice -- Social choice and efficiency -- Pure exchange and general equilibrium -- The neoclassical firm -- The competitive firm and perfect competition -- Monopoly -- Imperfect competition -- Modeling competitive situations -- Solution concepts for noncooperative games -- Incomplete information and irrationality -- Repeated play: Cooperation and reputation -- Bilateral bargaining -- Moral hazard and incentives -- Moral hazard and incentives -- The revelation principle and mechanism design -- Theories of the firm -- Transaction cost economics and the firm -- Constrained optimization -- Dynamic programming

The book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. The work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth. Information economics is explored next. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transaction-cost economics.