TY  - BOOK
AU  - Hausken,Kjell
AU  - Zhuang,Jun
TI  - Game theoretic analysis of congestion, safety and security: traffic and transportation theory 
T2  - Springer series in reliability engineering  
SN  - 9783319116730
U1  - 388.31 23
PY  - 2015///
CY  - Cham : 
PB  - Springer
KW  - Traffic flow
KW  - Mathematical models.
KW  - Traffic congestion
KW  - Game theory.
N1  - Includes bibliographical references and indexes; Congestion Management in Motorways and Urban Networks Through a Bargaining-Game-Based Coordination Mechanism / Bart De Schutter --
 Advanced Information Feedback Coupled with an Evolutionary Game in Intelligent Transportation Systems / Bokui Chen --
 Solving a Dynamic User-Optimal Route Guidance Problem Based on Joint Strategy Fictitious Play / Tai-Yu Ma --
 A Psycho-Social Agent-Based Model of Driver Behavior Dynamics / Ioannis Katerelos --
 Game-Theoretic Context and Interpretation of Kerner's Three-Phase Traffic Theory / Hubert Rehborn --
 A Heuristic Method for Identifying Near-Optimal Defending Strategies for a Road Network Subject to Traffic Congestion / Tao Yao --
 Multiple Stakeholders in Road Pricing: A Game Theoretic Approach / Eric C. van Berkum --
 Stackelberg and Inverse Stackelberg Road Pricing Games: State of the Art and Future Research / Alexander Boudewijn
N2  - This book establishes a new research angle by illustrating linkages between different research approaches and through laying the foundations for subsequent analysis. Congestion (excessive crowding) is defined in this work as all kinds of flows; e.g., road/sea/air traffic, people, data, information, water, electricity, and organisms. Analyzing systems where congestion occurs ? which may be in parallel, series, interlinked, or interdependent, with flows one way or both ways ? this book puts forward new congestion models, breaking new ground by introducing game theory and safety/security. Addressing the multiple actors who may hold different concerns regarding system reliability; e.g. one or several terrorists, a government, various local or regional government agencies, or others with stakes for or against system reliability, this book describes how governments authorities, and others may have the tools to handle congestion, but that these tools need to be improved whilst additionally ensuring safety and security against various threats. This game-theoretic analysis sets this book apart from the current congestion literature and ensures that the book will be of use to postgraduates, researchers, 3rd/4th-year undergraduates, policy makers, and practitioners.
ER  -