Stability and (obviously) strategy-proofness in matching theory/ Pinaki Mandal
Material type: TextPublication details: Kolkata: Indian Statistical Institute, 2021Description: 118 pagesSubject(s): DDC classification:- 23 306.8193 M271
- Guided by Prof. Souvik Roy.
Item type | Current library | Call number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
THESIS | ISI Library, Kolkata | 306.8193 M271 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | E-Thesis | TH532 |
Thesis (Ph.D.) - Indian Statistical Institute, 2022
Includes bibliographical references
Introduction -- Obviously strategy-proof implementation of assignment rules: a new characterization -- On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options -- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods when preferences are single-peaked -- Matchings under stability, minimum regret, and forced and forbidden pairs in marriage problem
Guided by Prof. Souvik Roy.
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