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001 978-0-387-49896-6
003 DE-He213
005 20181204132646.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 100301s2007 xxu| s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9780387498966
_9978-0-387-49896-6
024 7 _a10.1007/978-0-387-49896-6
_2doi
040 _aISI Library, Kolkata
050 4 _aQA1-939
072 7 _aPB
_2bicssc
072 7 _aMAT000000
_2bisacsh
072 7 _aPB
_2thema
082 0 4 _a510
_223
100 1 _aBrams, Steven J.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 1 0 _aApproval Voting
_h[electronic resource] /
_cby Steven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn.
250 _aSecond Edition.
264 1 _aNew York, NY :
_bSpringer New York,
_c2007.
300 _aXXII, 200 p. 4 illus.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 _aIntroduction: Overview of the Problem and Its Solution -- Sincerity and Strategy-Proofness: Which System Is Most Honest? -- The Condorcet Criterion: Which System Best Finds the Majority Candidate? -- The Reconstruction of an Election under Alternative Rules -- Power and Equity: Which System Is Fairest? -- Deducing Condorcet Candidates from Election Data -- Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections -- Recent Empirical Examples and Theoretical Extensions -- Deducing Preferences and Choices in the 1980 Presidential Election -- Epilogue.
520 _aApproval Voting proposes a compelling way to elect some 500,000 officials in public elections. Under this system voters may vote for, or approve of, as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections. Among the many benefits of approval voting are its propensity to elect the majority candidate (rather than the strongest minority candidate, as often occurs under plurality voting), its relative invulnerability to insincere or strategic voting, and—by offering voters the opportunity to influence election outcomes more equitably—a probable increase in voter turnout. Since the publication of the first edition of this book, its arguments in favor of an election reform practically unknown in 1983 have stood the test of time. Perhaps the proof of the pudding lies in the adoption of approval voting by about a dozen professional societies—several with tens of thousands of members—and their generally favorable experience with it. After a generation of discussion and debate on the subject, the authors remain convinced that Approval Voting is as relevant today as it was when rigorous analysis and systematic empirical research on this election reform began more than 30 years ago.
650 0 _aMathematics.
650 0 _aPublic finance.
650 0 _aPolitical science.
650 0 _aEconomic theory.
650 1 4 _aMathematics, general.
_0http://scigraph.springernature.com/things/product-market-codes/M00009
650 2 4 _aPublic Economics.
_0http://scigraph.springernature.com/things/product-market-codes/W34000
650 2 4 _aPolitical Science.
_0http://scigraph.springernature.com/things/product-market-codes/911000
650 2 4 _aEconomic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.
_0http://scigraph.springernature.com/things/product-market-codes/W29000
700 1 _aFishburn, Peter C.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9780387517308
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9780387498959
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-49896-6
912 _aZDB-2-SMA
942 _cEB
950 _aMathematics and Statistics (Springer-11649)
999 _c425584
_d425584